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Two experiments were conducted to explore the extent to which individuals with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), as well as young typically developing (TD) 
children, are explicitly aware of their own and others’ intentions.  In Experiment 1, 
participants with ASD were significantly less likely than age- and ability-matched 
comparison participants to correctly recognise their own knee-jerk reflex movements 
as unintentional.  Performance on this knee-jerk task was associated with performance 
on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in 
both participants with ASD and TD children. 
 In Experiment 2, participants with ASD were significantly less able than 
comparison participants to correctly recognise their own or another person’s mistaken 
actions as unintended, in a ‘Transparent Intentions’ task (Russell & Hill, 2001; 
Russell, Hill & Franco, 2001).  Performance on aspects of the Transparent Intentions 
task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, 
independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. 
 This study suggests that individuals with ASD have a limited awareness of 
their own and others’ intentions and that such awareness requires a meta-













Actions, unlike accidents, are considered to have distinctive mental causes, namely an 
intention to perform the action and a belief that such an action is possible (e.g., 
Davidson, 1963).  In order to account for actions which are not obviously 
accompanied by any conscious mental state (e.g., changing gear in a car), Searle 
(1983) has distinguished between two different kinds of intention.  A ‘prior intention’ 
is a purely mental-representational state which is conscious and which can occur 
regardless of whether any action is actually performed.  An ‘intention-in-action’, by 
contrast, serves to guide ongoing action and is often, but not always (as in the 
example of automatically changing car gears), explicitly conscious. 
 The upshot of this position is that to grasp the distinction between an action 
and an accident, a person may need to recognise the mental states – specifically, the 
intentions – that underlie behaviour.  In this context, several studies of young typically 
developing (TD) infants have indicated the presence of a rudimentary appreciation of 
others’ intentions from at least 18 months of age.  In a study by Meltzoff (1995; see 
also, Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999), 18-month-olds saw an adult either successfully 
completing an intended action (e.g., pulling apart two halves of a dumbbell), or trying 
to complete the action but failing (the adult’s hand would ‘accidentally’ slip of the 
dumbbell, resulting in the two halves failing to separate).  Meltzoff found that when 
infants in this latter ‘failed attempt’ condition were offered the materials they had seen 
the adult act upon, they did not simply copy the surface behaviour they had observed 
(i.e., slipping), but would actually complete the action the adult had intended but 
failed to achieve (pulling the dumbbell apart).  Indeed, infants in the failed attempt 
condition pulled the dumbbell apart as frequently as infants in the ‘full demonstration’ 
condition, who had observed the adult complete the action.  This finding suggests that 
from at least 18 months, infants can accurately distinguish the mental states of the 
actor from the behaviour the actor actually displays.  Similarly, Carpenter, Akhtar, 
and Tomasello (1998) showed that both 12- and 18-month-olds would copy an adult’s 
action when the action was accompanied by the vocalisation ‘There!’ (to signal the 
action had been intentional), but not when the action was accompanied by the 
vocalisation ‘Whoops!’ (to signal that the action was unintended).  In this case, young 
infants appear to distinguish very similar actions on the basis of the actor’s underlying 
goal. 
 Although the results of studies employing imitation paradigms to explore 
mental state recognition in young infants are not uncontroversial (see Huang, Heyes, 
& Charman, 2002), they do suggest that some aspects of others’ minds are registered 
by infants from at least 18 months of age.  However, it is highly debateable whether 
young infants/children have the same grasp of intentions as older children do.  Several 
researchers have argued that young children, before approximately 4 years of age, do 
not properly distinguish intentions from desires (e.g., Astington, 1993; Feinfield et al., 
1999; Moses, 1993).  Desires and intentions are similar in many ways.  Both are 
mental states which are either fulfilled or unfulfilled, unlike mental states like beliefs 
which are either true or false, and much of the time desires and intentions coincide in 
any particular individual.  However, the two mental states are not synonymous, as is 
evident from the fact that one can desire an outcome that one has no intention to bring 
about and, conversely, one can intend to do something that one does not desire.  
Astington (1993, pp.91-92) highlights the crucial distinction between desires and 
intentions as follows, “Desires are fulfilled so long as the outcome is achieved, it 
doesn’t matter how, but intentions are carried out only if the intention causes the 
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action that achieves the outcome”.  Now, the results provided by Meltzoff (1995) and 
Carpenter et al. (1998), amongst others, do not establish whether infants represent 
(and therefore copy) the intentions underlying others’ behaviour, or whether their 
representation is of an undifferentiated desire-intention state.  In other words, infants 
could simply have produced an action which they interpreted as having been desired 
by the adult actor, rather than intended as such. 
 Some researchers (e.g., Perner, 1991) have suggested that recognition of 
intentions as mental states that are differentiated from desires emerges later in 
development and depends upon a meta-representational theory of mind (ToM).  
Traditionally, performance on so-called false belief tasks is seen as the ‘acid test’ of a 
meta-representational ToM (Dennett, 1978).  Typically developing children pass such 
tasks from approximately age 4 to 5 years (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001) and, 
importantly, there is evidence that their understanding of intentional action undergoes 
a developmental shift in this same period.  For example, in line with the arguments of 
Astington (1993) and others, young TD children have difficulty representing 
intentions (independently of desires), in self or other, in scenarios where the desire is 
not obvious (e.g., Astington & Lee, 1991; Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green & Flavell, 
1999) or when the desire conflicts with the intention (e.g., Feinfield et al., 1999; 
Philips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 1998).   
In the study by Phillips et al. (1998), children attempted to hit a pre-specified 
target in a rigged shooting game.  Some of the targets contained prizes whilst others 
did not.  Phillips et al. found that 5-year-olds were able to report their prior intention 
to hit a particular target whether or not their intention was fulfilled and regardless of 
whether or not the target yielded a prize (i.e., whether or not their desire was 
satisfied).  On the other hand, the pattern of performance shown by 4-year-olds on this 
task suggested that they did not understand their own intentions as differentiated from 
their own desires.  When there was a discrepancy between their intention and their 
desire, 4-year-olds tended to perform poorly.  For example, unlike 5-year-olds, if they 
succeeded in hitting the target of their choice (i.e., fulfilled their intention) but that 
target did not contain a prize (i.e., did not satisfy their desire), 4-year-olds denied 
having intended to hit the target.  
Further suggesting that young children have difficulty in explicitly 
representing their own intentions, Shultz et al. (1980) found that children below 
approximately 5 years of age tended to incorrectly report their own knee-jerk reflex as 
an intentional action.  Reflexes, unlike deliberate actions, are accompanied neither by 
desires nor intentions.   With no possibility of matching goals and outcomes, one may 
require a coherent concept of intention, differentiated from desire, in order to 
recognise a reflex movement as an ‘accident’.  Further evidence for a relationship 
between understanding reflexes and a meta-representational ToM was provided by 
Lang and Perner (2002).  They found that the performance of TD children on an 
unexpected contents false belief task was highly correlated with performance on the 
knee-jerk task, even after the influences of age and verbal ability were controlled.   
Using a different methodology, Russell, Hill and Franco (2001) found further 
evidence that young TD children do not possess a coherent concept of intention.  In a 
‘Transparent Intentions’ task, children were asked to complete a drawing of, for 
instance, a boy with a missing ear, on a transparency like those used with overhead 
projectors.  Unknown to the child, a second transparency with a different, unfinished 
drawing (e.g., of a cup with a missing handle) was laid in precise alignment on top of 
the first transparency.  Therefore, participants ended up unintentionally finishing off 
the top drawing (of a handle on a cup) rather than the bottom drawing (of an ear on a 
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boy).  When their mistake was revealed, children were asked both what they had 
meant to draw and what they had thought they were drawing throughout their action.  
These two types of test question were designed to assess participants’ awareness of 
their own prior intentions and intentions-in-action, respectively (see below and also 
Russell et al., p.780 for further discussion).  Russell et al. also included an Other-
person condition in which children observed a glove puppet performing the same 
actions and making the same errors. 
  Findings from Russell et al.’s (2001) study indicated that 4-year-olds were 
significantly better than 3-year-olds at answering correctly what they had meant to 
draw.  In contrast, 3-year-olds were as able as 4-year-olds to correctly distinguish 
between what they had thought they were drawing and what they had mistakenly 
drawn.  The same pattern also held in the Other-person condition.  Finally, Russell et 
al. found that performance on the Transparent Intentions task (as measured by a 
composite of performance on the four test questions, across Self and Other-person 
conditions) was not related significantly to ToM (as measured by a composite of 
performance across three different ToM tests) in these TD participants.   
It is debateable, however, whether the different types of Transparent Intentions 
test question are measuring the same underlying knowledge of intentions.  Russell et 
al. (2001) suggest, first (p.780), that both the ‘Mean’ and ‘Think’ question-types 
assess awareness of intentions-in-action.  In a footnote (p.780), however, they seem to 
suggest that the Mean question refers to a prior intention, whereas the Think question 
refers more to an intention-in-action: “one can regard the mean question as referring 
to a discrete mental event and the think question as referring to a continuous 
experience.  An intention-in-action, in contrast to a prior intention, would seem to 
invite the use of continuous aspect”.  If these different forms of question measure 
different underlying knowledge, it is questionable why Russell et al. implemented a 
composite measure of performance across both types of question for comparison with 
ToM performance.  If only one of the question types reliably measures knowledge of 
the mental-representational aspects of intention, then perhaps answering only these 
questions (in Self and Other conditions) requires ToM, whereas answering the other 
type of question does not.   
 
Understanding of intentions in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a condition diagnosed on the basis of 
severe impairments in social interaction and communication, and a rigid and repetitive 
behavioural repertoire (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  On the cognitive 
level, ASD is characterized by deficits in ToM.  Individuals with ASD show delayed 
(e.g., Happé, 1995) and atypical (e.g., Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) performance on false 
belief tasks, and in everyday life their social and communicative difficulties suggest 
they do not fully grasp the mental states underlying people’s behaviour. 
Studies exploring the awareness of intentions by individuals with ASD have 
produced mixed results.  Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, and Bower (2000) found that 
young, preverbal children with ASD were unexpectedly competent at completing the 
‘failed attempts’ of actors, in the behavioural re-enactment paradigm implemented by 
Meltzoff (1995) and Bellagamba and Tomasello (1998) with TD infants.  This finding 
led Aldridge et al. (p.294) to claim that “preverbal children with autism understand 
the intentions of others”.  However, as discussed above, such imitation paradigms 
provide little information about the content of children’s representations of mental 
states.  Even if one accepts that successful performance on such tasks indicates a 
rudimentary awareness of mind (and see Huang et al., 2002, for an ecological, non-
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representational account of successful performance), it seems probable that 
participants need only represent the experimenter’s desires, rather than intentions, in 
order to succeed.  In this regard, it is important to highlight how children with autism 
appear well able to represent the simple desires of other people despite their poor 
performance on multiple other measures of ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Tan & Harris, 
1991).   
Together, these findings appear to support the suggestion made above that 
successful performance on such imitation tasks does not rely on an awareness of the 
mental-representational aspects of intentions.  Indeed, in the small number of studies 
exploring intention understanding in ASD that have used different paradigms, results 
tend to indicate impairment in affected children.  For example, Phillips et al. (1998) 
assessed children with ASD on the previously mentioned target-shooting task that 
they also implemented with young TD children.  Like young TD children, participants 
with ASD (but not matched comparison participants) performed poorly when there 
was a discrepancy between their intention and their desire.  For instance, when 
participants with ASD mistakenly hit an unspecified target (i.e., did not fulfil their 
intention) but that target contained a prize (i.e., fulfilled their desire), they tended to 
incorrectly claim that they had meant to hit the target.  Like young TD children, 
therefore, individuals with ASD appear to confuse their own desires and intentions 
(although see Russell & Hill, 2001, Experiment 2, for alternative findings).   
In contrast, Russell and Hill (2001, Experiment 3) found that, relative to 
matched comparison participants with moderate learning difficulties (MLD), children 
with ASD were relatively unimpaired on the ‘Transparent Intentions’ task 
implemented with TD participants by Russell et al. (2001).  In the Self condition of 
the task, Russell and Hill found that when the ‘Mean’ question (‘What did you mean 
to draw?’) was asked before the ‘Think’ question (‘What did you think you were 
drawing?’), children with ASD were significantly impaired relative to comparison 
children.  Only approximately 50% of participants with ASD correctly recognised that 
they had not intended the actual outcome.  However, no other between-group 
differences reached significance, leading Russell and Hill (p.326) to conclude that 
“while there was a weak trend in the transparent intentions task for children with 
autism to perform at a lower level than children with MLD… there was certainly 
nothing in these data to justify the term ‘autistic deficit’”.   
There are, however, potential concerns about the data and design of Russell 
and Hill’s (2001) experiment which suggest that the results should be interpreted 
cautiously.  Firstly, the use of a repeated-measures design, in which the order of 
(Self/Other) condition presentation was counter-balanced, resulted in some of Russell 
and Hill’s participants receiving the Other-person condition of the task first.  Having 
already seen the crucial experimental manipulation – that there were two 
transparencies even though there only appeared to be one – participants who 
undertook the Other-person condition first would have had some knowledge that they 
were being ‘tricked’ throughout their own action in the subsequent Self condition.  
This may have altered the nature of the task for these participants.  Counterbalancing 
of conditions could well have confounded results, therefore.   
A second difficulty with Russell and Hill’s (2001) experiment, which may also 
have affected the results of Russell et al. (2001), was the nature of the stimuli used.  In 
two out of the four drawing combinations used, the missing piece on each 
transparency was very similar.  Hence, in one combination, the participant intended to 
draw smoke emerging from the chimney of a house (on the bottom transparency) and 
ended up drawing smoke emerging from the chimney of a boat (on the top 
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transparency).  In another example, the participant intended to draw a face on a girl 
and ended up drawing a face on a boy.  In these cases, children ended up drawing 
objects so similar to those that they intended to draw, that there may have been no 
perceived mistake to report.  
One further possibility for the lack of group differences in Russell and Hill’s 
(2001) study was the surprisingly poor performance of their comparison group on a 
standard unexpected contents false belief task.  Nearly two thirds of participants from 
each diagnostic group failed the Other-person test question from this measure.  As 
such, it is perhaps not surprising that both groups found the experimental task 
difficult, given its potential relation to ToM.  Indeed, the numbers of participants in 
each group failing each of the four test questions on the Transparent Intentions task 
was closely in line with the numbers failing the false belief task, although Russell and 
Hill did not analyse the interactions between these tasks. 
The two experiments reported in this paper assessed the explicit awareness 
children with ASD, as well as young TD children, have of their own and others’ 
intentions.  In Experiment 1, participants’ awareness of their own knee-jerk reflex 
movements was assessed.  Firstly, it was predicted that participants with ASD would 
incorrectly report their reflex movements as intentional significantly more often than 
comparison participants with developmental delay (DD).   Secondly, it was predicted 
that performance on the knee-jerk task would be associated significantly with 
performance on measures of false belief understanding, independently of 
chronological age (CA) and verbal mental age (VMA).  Regarding TD participants, it 
was predicted that performance on the knee-jerk task would be significantly 
associated with false belief understanding, independently of CA and VMA (cf. Perner 
& Lang, 2002).  
In Experiment 2, participants undertook a revised version of the Transparent 
Intentions task, in which the methodological confounds that may have biased results 
in the studies by Russell and Hill (2001) and Russell et al. (2001) were eliminated.  
First, it was predicted that participants with ASD would perform significantly less 
well than DD participants on each of the four test questions, incorporating both the 
‘Mean’ (i.e., ‘What did you mean to draw?’) and ‘Think’ (i.e., ‘What did you think 
you were drawing?’) question-types, across both Self and Other conditions.  Second, 
it was predicted that performance on the Transparent Intentions task would be 
associated significantly with ToM performance, independently of CA and VMA, in all 








Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the joint South London and 
Maudsley NHS Trust/Institute of Psychiatry Research Ethics Committee.  Twenty-
two children with ASD and 22 comparison children participated in Experiment 1, 
after parents/guardians had given written, informed consent for their children to be 
included.  The participants in the ASD group had received formal diagnoses, by a 
trained psychiatrist or pediatrician, of autistic disorder (n = 20), Asperger’s disorder 
(n = 1), or atypical autism/pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
(PDD-NOS; n = 1) according to established criteria (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2000).  All participants in this group attended specialist autism schools, 
which required a diagnosis of autism, Asperger’s syndrome or PDD-NOS for entry 
into the school.  The comparison (developmentally delayed; DD) group consisted of 
19 children with general learning disability of unknown origin and 3 TD children who 
were recruited for comparison with those (3) children in the ASD group who achieved 
IQ scores in the ‘average’ range (i.e., over 90).  Finally, a separate group of 32 TD 
children also took part. 
   
Background Assessments 
 
Baseline verbal and non-verbal abilities were assessed by an appropriate measure for 
the developmental level of each participant.  The verbal abilities of 16 (out of 22)  
children with ASD and 17 (out of 22) DD children were assessed by performance on 
the Vocabulary and Information subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children – Third Edition UK (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991).  The verbal IQ estimate 
gained from this short form has high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  Because the lowest 
test age-equivalent offered by the WISC-III is 6 years and 2 months, the VMA of any 
participant who fell below this level on either of the verbal subtests could not be 
calculated.  Under these circumstances, participants were administered the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale – Second Edition (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997), which offers 
test age-equivalents down to 2 years and 11 months.  In this instance, the verbal 
abilities of six (out of 22) children with ASD and five (out of 22) DD comparison 
children were assessed with the BPVS.  The verbal ability of all TD children was 
assessed by the BPVS. 
The non-verbal ability of all ASD and DD participants was assessed by the 
Block Design and Picture Completion subtests of the WISC-III.  The performance IQ 
estimate gained from this short form has high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  Due to 
limited child availability, the non-verbal abilities of two participants with ASD and 
two DD comparison participants were not assessed
1
.  The non-verbal ability of TD 
children was not assessed.   
In addition to the 22 participants with ASD for whom matched DD 
comparison participants were available, a further 8 participants with ASD completed 
the knee-jerk task but did not have suitable matches and were not therefore included 
in the between-participant analyses.  However, these participants were suitable for 
inclusion in subsequent within-participant analyses (assessing relationships between 
tasks), increasing the power of the analyses.  The characteristics of each participant 
group are presented in Table 1.  Statistical analyses showed that the ASD and DD 
groups were well matched on all variables: CA: t(42) = -0.55, p = .58, r = .08; VMA: 
t(42) = 0.28, p = .83, r = .04; VIQ: t(42) = 0.80, p = .43, r = .12; PIQ: t(38) = 0.86, p = 
.40, r = .14.     
 
Table 1 here 
 
Given that some ASD and DD participants received the Wechsler Scales (Wechsler, 
1991), whilst others received the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997), independent t-tests were 
conducted comparing ASD and DD participants from each sub-sample to ensure 
adequacy of matching in each case, as well as overall.  ASD and DD participants who 
received the Wechsler Scales were well matched on all variables (all ts < 1.14, all ps > 








Knee-jerk reflexes were elicited with a Queens reflex hammer, of the type used by 
medical doctors.  Participants sat on top of a table with their legs hanging comfortably 
over the edge.  In order to ensure that the participants were relaxed and reassured, the 
experimenter explained that the ‘little hammer’ was used for ‘tapping knees’ and that 
it didn’t hurt because of the rubber disc on the end.  The participant was then offered 
an opportunity to tap the experimenter’s knee which most participants, including 
those with ASD, seemed to enjoy.  On no occasion was a reflex elicited in the 
experimenter during this preparatory ‘game’.  The experimenter then attempted to 
elicit a knee-jerk reflex in one of the participant’s legs.  If, after two attempts, no 
reflex was elicited, the experimenter moved to the other leg, reassuring the 
participant, “Now we’ll tap this knee”. Once a reflex had been elicited, the 
experimenter looked at the participant and said, ‘Look, your leg moved.  Did you 
mean to move you leg?’.  This was the only question asked, a correct response being 
that the participant had not meant to move their leg and an incorrect response being 
that they had meant to move their leg.   Only participants in whom a reflex was 
elicited were asked the test question. 
 
 Theory of Mind Assessment 
 
As measures of ToM, all ASD and DD participants received a traditional unexpected 
transfer (‘Sally-Anne’) false belief task as well as an unexpected contents task based 
on the traditional ‘Smarties’ false belief task (Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989).  
This ‘Plasters’ unexpected contents task involved both Self and Other-person test 
questions, regarding the participants’ own previous false belief and another’s false 
belief, respectively. 
All TD participants received the Plasters task and 31 (out of 32) also 




Overall, 15/22 (68.2%) participants from the ASD group and 20/30 (66.6%) from the 
extended ASD group passed the knee-jerk task (i.e., correctly reported their reflex 
movement as unintentional).  This compared to 21/22 (95.5%) DD participants and 
17/32 (53.1%) TD participants passing the task.  The difference in performance 
between ASD and DD participants was significant, ²(1) = 5.50, Fisher’s Exact p = 
.04,  = .35.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Relation Between Reflex Understanding and ToM 
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of ASD, DD, and TD participants passing each false 
belief measure, as well as each group’s mean total score across the three tasks.  
Participants with ASD (including those from the extended sample) performed 
significantly less well than DD participants on each measure: Plasters Self: ²(1) = 
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9.65, p = .002,  = .43; Plasters Other-person: ²(1) = 5.30, p = .02,  = .38; Sally-
Anne: ²(1) = 3.42, p (one-tailed) < .04,  = .26; Total False Belief Score: t(49.91) = -
2.91, p = .005, r = .38. 
Given the theoretical and empirical links between understanding reflex actions 
and ToM, a series of Chi-Square analyses were conducted to assess the degree of 
association in each group between performance on the knee-jerk task and performance 
on each false belief measure.        
 




In the extended sample of 30 participants with ASD, there was a significant 
association between performance on the Plasters Self question and performance on the 
knee-jerk task, ²(1) = 9.60, p = .002,  = .57.  The association between performance 
on the Plasters Other-person question and performance on the knee-jerk task was also 
significant, ²(1) = 4.34, p = .04,  = .38.  Finally, there was a significant association 
between performance on the Sally-Anne task and performance on the knee-jerk task, 
²(1) = 7.18, Fisher’s Exact p = .007,  = .49.   
In this expanded sample of ASD participants, success on the knee-jerk task 
was significantly related to VMA, rpb = .40, p = .03, and CA, rpb = .31, p (one-tailed) 
= .05.  The next step, therefore, was to ensure that the above associations between 
knee-jerk task performance and ToM performance were not simply an artifact of each 
task’s relationship with VMA and CA.  In order to assess this, the false belief 
composite score (see Table 2) was employed as a measure of ToM.  This composite 
was deemed valid after initial analyses revealed that performance on each of the three 
measures was strongly associated, in this sample ( = .73 - .76 between the three test 
questions).     
Bivariate point-biserial correlations revealed that performance on the knee-
jerk task was significantly associated with the false belief composite score, rpb = .53, p 
= .003.  When CA and VMA were controlled, in a partial correlation, this association 
remained significant, rpb = .40, p = .04. 
 
Developmentally Delayed Sample 
 
Given that only one comparison participant failed the knee-jerk test, the relationship 
between reflex understanding and ToM could not be assessed statistically.   
 
Typically Developing Sample 
 
In TD participants, there was a significant association between performance on the 
Plasters Self question and performance on the knee-jerk task, ²(1) = 7.04, p = .008,  
= .47.  In this sample, however, performance on the knee-jerk task was not 
significantly associated with performance on either the Plasters Other-person 
question, ²(1) = 0.98, p = .76,  = .06, or the Sally-Anne task, ²(1) = 2.92, Fishers 
Exact p = .15,  = .31. 
In these participants, success on the knee-jerk task was significantly related to 
VMA, rpb = .35, p = .05, but not to CA, rpb = .09, p = .65.  The next step, therefore, 
was to ensure that the association between knee-jerk task performance and 
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performance on the Plasters Self question was not an artifact of any mediating 
relationship with VMA.  A forced-entry logistic regression was therefore conducted 
with performance on the knee-jerk task (pass/fail) entered as the dependent variable.  
In the first instance, Plasters Self performance was entered as a predictor variable in 
the first block and VMA was included as a second predictor variable in block 2.  
Table 3 displays the regression statistics for this initial analysis.   
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The inclusion of Plasters Self in block 1 resulted in a significantly improved model, ² 
= 7.53, df = 1, p = .006, accounting for 28% of the variance in knee-jerk task 
performance (R
2
 = .28; see Table 3).  In block 1, Plasters Self was a significant 
predictor of knee-jerk task performance.  The inclusion of VMA in block 2 did not 
significantly improve the model, ² = 0.05, df = 1, p = .83.  VMA did not account for 
any additional variance in knee-jerk task performance over and above Plasters Self 
(R
2
 = .28; R² = .00).  However, after the inclusion of VMA in block 2, Plasters Self, 
as a predictor of knee-jerk task performance, only approached significance.  
In a second regression analysis (see Table 4), Plasters Self and VMA were 
entered in reverse order.  The inclusion of VMA in block 1 resulted in a significantly 
improved model, ² = 4.19, df = 1, p = .04, accounting for 16% of the variance in 
knee-jerk task performance (R
2
 = .16).  The significance of VMA as a predictor of 
knee-jerk task performance in block 1 only approached significance, Exp(B) = 0.54, 
df = 1, p = .06.  Following the inclusion of Plasters Self in block 2, the model 
accounted for 28% variance (R
2
 = .28).  This improvement in the model approached 
significance, ² = 3.39, df = 1, p = .07.  As such, Plasters Self accounted for an 
additional 12% of the variance in knee-jerk task performance over and above that 
accounted for by VMA (R² = .12), although statistically this addition only 
approached significance (see Table 4).     
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In order to check that multicollinearity was not biasing the data from the TD sample, 
collinearity diagnostics were performed.  The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
associated with each predictor variable was 1.95, well below the value of 10 at which 
Myers (1990, in Field, 2005, p.175) suggests multicollinearity is likely.  Further, the 
tolerance statistic for each predictor variable was .51, well above the value of .20 at, 
or below, which Menard (1995, in Field, 2005, p.175) suggests provides cause for 
concern.  Finally, Plasters Self had a condition index of 2.43, whilst VMA had a 
condition index of 11.74.  Whilst this is a difference of 9.31 units, Field (2005, p.261) 
describes a large and worrying difference as 74.43 units.  Given these checks, it is 




As predicted, participants with ASD were significantly less likely than matched 
comparison participants with developmental disability to accurately report their reflex 
movements as unintentional.  This suggests that individuals with ASD have a 
diminished awareness of their own intentional states.  Such a suggestion is supported 
by the strong associations observed between performance on each false belief measure 
and performance on the knee-jerk task, amongst these participants.  Importantly, the 
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association between ToM and performance on the knee-jerk task was not due to any 
confounding effects of age or general verbal ability, as the correlation between a false 
belief composite score and success on the knee-jerk task remained significant after the 
effects of CA and VMA had been controlled.  This finding is compatible with 
Perner’s (1991) suggestion that that a meta-representational ToM underlies success on 
the knee-jerk task. 
In TD participants, the relationship between ToM and reflex understanding 
was less straightforward.  The ability to represent one’s own prior false belief, as 
indexed by success on the Plasters Self question, was strongly and significantly 
associated with success on the knee-jerk task.  This association was largely 
independent of general linguistic ability, with a logistic regression analysis showing 
that Plasters Self performance explained an additional 12% of the variance in 
performance on the knee-jerk task over and above VMA alone.    
Contrary to predictions, however, performance on the knee-jerk task was not 
significantly associated with performance on any other of the false belief measures, in 
TD participants.  Particularly relevant was the finding that, contra Perner and Lang 
(2002), performance on the Sally-Anne task was not correlated significantly with 
performance on the knee-jerk task.  Note, however, that whilst not statistically 
significant, the strength of the relationship between the two tasks was nonetheless 
moderate in magnitude ( = .31).  The explanation for the non-significance of this 
effect may lie in the surprising ease with which TD participants in this study passed 
the Sally-Anne task, with only 6 (out of 32; see Table 2) participants failing.  As such, 
these ceiling effects prevent an accurate assessment of the relationship between Sally-
Anne and knee-jerk task performance in this sample of TD participants.   
Therefore, Experiment 1 provided evidence that children with ASD are 
impaired in their understanding of reflex movements and that this impairment is 
directly related to ToM deficits.  The next experiment in this paper explored the extent 
to which children with ASD, as well as young TD children, could recognize and 








Thirty-four children with ASD, 30 comparison children, and 35 TD children 
completed the Transparent Intentions task.  The (developmentally disabled; DD) 
comparison group consisted of 25 children with general learning disability and 5 TD 
children who were recruited for comparison with those children in the ASD group 
who achieved IQ scores in the ‘average’ range (i.e., over 90).  The verbal ability of 14 
(out of 34) children with ASD and 17 (out of 30) comparison children was assessed 
by performance on the Vocabulary and Information subtests of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition UK (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991).  The 
verbal ability of the remaining 20 participants with ASD and 13 DD participants was 
assessed by performance on the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997).  Non-verbal ability was 
assessed by the Block Design and Picture Completion subtests of the WISC-III.  Due 
to limited child availability, the non-verbal ability of five (out of 34) participants with 
ASD and six (out of 30) DD comparison participants was not assessed.  The 
characteristics of each participant group are presented in Table 5.  Statistical analyses 
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showed that the ASD and DD groups were well matched for: CA: t(62) = -0.07, p = 
.95, r = 0.01; VMA: t(59.66) = 0.25, p = .80, r = 0.03; VIQ: t(62) = 0.65, p = .52, r = 
0.08.  However, compared to DD participants, ASD participants had significantly 
higher PIQs: t(51) = 2.29, p = .03, r = 0.31.     
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Given that some ASD and DD participants received the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991), 
whilst others received the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1997), independent t-tests were 
conducted on each sub-sample to ensure adequacy of matching in each case, as well 
as overall.   
In the WISC-III sub-sample, participants with ASD (mean CA = 14.10, SD = 
1.04) were significantly older than DD participants (mean CA = 12.93, SD = 1.42), 
t(29) = 2.56, p = .02, r = .43.  Participants with ASD (mean VMA = 10.13, SD = 2.11) 
also had significantly higher VMAs than DD participants (mean VMA = 8.51, SD = 
1.68), t(29) = 2.38, p = .02, r = .40.  No other significant differences were found 
between groups in the Wechsler sub-sample (all ts < 1.74, all ps > .09). 
In the BPVS sub-sample, participants with ASD had significantly higher PIQs 
(mean PIQ = 75.87, SD = 24.74) than DD participants (mean PIQ = 53.29, SD = 
8.69), t(20) = 2.32, p = .03, r = .46.   No other significant differences were found 
between groups in the BPVS sub-sample (all ts < 0.47, all ps > .64). 
 
Design and Procedures 
 
 Transparent Intentions Task 
 
The experimental task, based on that used by Russell and Hill (2001, Experiment 3), 
involved 2 sheets of transparent acetate (A and B) each with a different (incomplete) 
drawing on.  When the sheets were placed on top of each other, the drawings became 
perfectly aligned resulting in only one – the drawing on the bottom sheet – being 
visible.  For example, one pair of pictures involved a teacup with a missing handle 
(picture A) and a choir boy with a missing ear (picture B).   When A was placed on B, 
only B could be seen.  Figure 2 shows the experimental pictures (taken from Russell 
& Hill, p.324) used. 
  
Figure 2 here 
  
In the Self condition, which was always undertaken first, participants were shown 
what appeared to be a single transparency (i.e., picture B) and asked to label, verbally, 
the missing part and then draw it in.  After this, the transparencies were separated to 
reveal the top picture (picture A) which the child had unintentionally completed.  
Participants were then asked a control question, followed by two test questions (the 
order of the test questions being counterbalanced across participants): 
 
Control question: What did you draw? (pointing to picture A) 
 
‘Mean’ question: What did you mean to draw? If no spontaneous response was given, 
the experimenter gave a follow-up question: ‘Did you mean to draw an X or a Y?’.  
The order of referring to the pictures was counterbalanced. 
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‘Think’ question: Remember, when you were doing the drawing, what did you think 
you were drawing?  If no spontaneous response was given, the experimenter gave a 
follow-up question: ‘Did you think you were drawing an X or a Y?’.  The order of 
referring to the pictures was counterbalanced. 
 
The control question was included in this study, unlike in Russell and Hill’s (2001) 
study, to ensure that participants were not answering the test questions based on a 
perceived match between their (unfulfilled) intention and reality.  That is, it was 
possible for a child to say that they had ‘intended’ to draw a boy’s ear (when, in fact, 
they had drawn the handle of a tea cup) because they did not recognise the mismatch 
between their intention and reality (i.e., they believed that they really had drawn a 
boy’s ear and answered in accordance with this misrepresented reality). 
In the Other-person condition, which followed immediately after the Self 
condition, children were told that the experimenter had ‘played this game with another 
person’ and had filmed it.  Participants were then shown a 30-second clip of the 
experimenter administering the task to a colleague who pretended to be ignorant of 
the set-up.  The clip ended at the moment when the experimenter separated the 
transparencies to reveal that the colleague had, in fact, drawn on picture A, and not B 
as they had intended.  Participants were then asked the same three questions as in the 
Self condition, but with regard to the other person’s intentions. 
The Other-person condition in this study differed to the Other-person 
condition in Russell and Hill’s (2001) study, in that they used a glove puppet to 
complete the drawings.  It was felt that a standardised video of an actor undertaking 
the task was more naturalistic and ecologically valid, however, leading to the use of a 
video clip in the current study. 
Finally, this study differed from Russell and Hill’s (2001) study in using only 
2 sets of pictures, which were counterbalanced across Self and Other conditions (see 
Figure 2, above).  This avoided the potential confound identified with the two 
additional sets of stimulus pictures, used by Russell and Hill, that depicted two very 
similar objects (see above discussion).  The items within each set of pictures used in 
this study were clearly very different to one another, making correct and incorrect 
answers to test questions easier to distinguish. 
  
Theory of Mind Assessment 
 
As measures of ToM, participants received the Sally-Anne unexpected transfer and 
Plasters unexpected contents tasks.   Data from the Plasters task was available for 
33/34 ASD participants, 29/30 DD participants and 34/35 TD participants.  Data from 
the Sally-Anne task was available for all ASD and TD participants, but only 33/35 TD 




Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of ASD, DD, and TD participants passing each test 
question from the Transparent Intentions task.  In the Self condition, participants with 
ASD performed significantly less well than DD participants on the ‘Mean’ question, 
²(1) = 8.81, p = .003,  = .37, but not the ‘Think’ question, ²(1) = 1.42, p = .23,  = 
.15.  In the Other-person condition, participants with ASD performed significantly 
less well than DD participants on both the ‘Mean’ question, ²(1) = 3.71, p = .05,  = 
.24, and the ‘Think’ question, ²(1) = 6.43, p = .01,  = .32. 
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Figure 3 about here 
 
Relation Between ToM and Performance on the Transparent Intentions Task 
 
The percentage of ASD, DD, and TD participants passing each false belief measure, 
as well as each group’s mean total score across the three tasks, is presented in Table 6.  
Participants with ASD performed significantly less well than DD participants on each 
measure: Plasters Self: ²(1) = 8.50, p = .004,  = .37; Plasters Other-person: ²(1) = 
4.11, p = .04,  = .26; Sally-Anne: ²(1) = 3.71, p = .05,  = .24; Total False Belief 
Score: t(58.28) = -2.84, p = .006, r = .35. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
In order to assess the relationship between ToM and performance on the Transparent 
Intentions task, a false belief composite score (0 – 3) was assigned to each participant, 
on the basis of their performance on each of the false belief measures (see Table 6).  
This composite was deemed valid for participants with ASD after initial analyses 
revealed that performance on each of the three measures was strongly associated in 
this sample ( = .52 - .69 between the three test questions).  In TD participants, 
performance on the Plasters Self and Plasters Other-person test questions was strongly 
associated ( = .59).  However, in this TD sample, performance on the Sally-Anne 
task was associated only moderately with performance on the Plasters Self question ( 
= .34) and weakly with performance on the Plasters Other question ( = .07).   
Therefore, it is debatable whether a composite consisting of these three measures is 
valid amongst these participants.  However, for the current purposes it was decided to 
use this composite score (0 – 3) for statistical analyses because (a) it allowed direct 
comparison of correlations between ToM and Transparent Intentions task 
performance amongst ASD and TD participants and; (b) exactly the same patterns of 
correlation between the Transparent Intentions task and ToM were observed when the 
ToM composite consisted only of performance across the Plasters Self and Other test 
questions (0 – 2) (see Table 7).   
Table 7 displays the point-biserial correlations between ToM and performance 
on each test question from the Transparent Intentions task.  Given that a relationship 
between ToM and performance on the Transparent Intentions task was predicted a 




For participants with ASD, initial analyses revealed significant bivariate point-biserial 
correlations between ToM composite score and each test question (Mean and Think) 
in each condition (Self and Other) of the Transparent Intentions task.  When CA and 
VMA were controlled, however, only the correlations between ToM composite score 
and the Think question in the Self condition and the Think question in the Other-
person condition remained significant.   The correlations between ToM composite 
score and the Mean test questions in each condition were not significant, after 





Since DD participants performed at near ceiling levels on the Transparent Intentions 
task (over 90% passed each test question, on average), data from this sample were not 
analysed.   
 
Typically Developing Sample 
 
For TD participants, initial analyses revealed significant bivariate point-biserial 
correlations between ToM composite score and the Think test question in the Self 
condition, as well as the Think test question in the Other-person condition.  The 
bivariate correlation between ToM composite score and the Mean test questions in 
each condition were not significant in this sample of TD participants.  When CA and 
VMA were controlled, the correlations between ToM composite score and the Think 
questions in each condition remained significant.    
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Relative Difficulty of the Question Types 
 
In order to assess the relative difficulty of the Transparent Intentions Mean and Think 
test questions, patterns of within-participant performance were explored using 
McNemar tests, focusing on those participants who passed only one of the two 
questions in the Self and Other conditions, respectively.  Since DD participants 
performed at near ceiling levels (over 90% passed each test question, on average), 
data from this sample were not analysed.   
In the Self condition of the Transparent Intentions task, three (9.1%) 
participants with ASD failed the Think question despite passing the Mean question 
and two (6.1%) participants showed the opposite pattern of performance.  For 
participants with ASD, therefore, the two test questions did not vary systematically in 
difficulty, ²(1) = 14.06, McNemar’s p > .99.  In TD participants, the pattern was 
different: whereas 12 (34.3%) TD children failed the Think question despite passing 
the Mean question, only two (5.7%) children displayed the opposite pattern of 
performance.  For these participants, therefore, the Think question was significantly 
more difficult than the Mean question in the Self condition of the Transparent 
Intentions task, ²(1) = 0.70, McNemar’s p = .01.   
In the Other-person condition of the Transparent Intentions task, five (14.7%) 
participants with ASD failed the Think question despite passing the Mean question 
and two (5.9%) participants showed the opposite pattern of performance. For 
participants with ASD, the two test questions did not vary systematically in difficulty, 
²(1) = 10.46, McNemar’s p = .45.  In the TD sample, nine (25.7%) participants failed 
the Think question despite passing the Mean question, whereas only two (5.7%) 
children displayed the opposite pattern of performance.  This difference was very 




Relative to matched comparison participants, children with ASD were clearly 
impaired on the Transparent Intentions task.  Over one-third of participants with ASD 
incorrectly reported that both they and another person had (a) intended a mistaken 
action and; (b) thought that this (mistake) was the action they were performing 
throughout.  In contrast, comparison participants were generally highly proficient at 
 17 
distinguishing their own and another’s unfulfilled intentions from reality.   In this 
regard, comparison participants were significantly superior to participants with ASD, 
except on the Self ‘Think’ question which approximately 20% failed.    These findings 
stand in contrast to those of Russell and Hill (2001) who found children with ASD to 
be impaired, relative to matched comparison participants, on the ‘Mean’ question in 
the Self condition only.    
 Amongst both participants with ASD and TD children, ToM was associated 
significantly with performance only on the Think questions (in Self and Other 
conditions) of the Transparent Intentions task, independent of age and verbal ability.   
This contrasts with Russell et al.’s (2001) finding that ToM was not related to overall 




The findings from the two experiments reported here provide further evidence that 
individuals with ASD are impaired in their understanding of their own and others’ 
intentions.   Relative to age- and ability-matched DD comparison participants, 
participants with ASD were less able to recognise their own reflex movements as 
unintentional (in Experiment 1) or their own mistaken actions as unintended (in 
Experiment 2).  In each case, these impairments were associated with a specific 
difficulty in representing false beliefs – a proxy for ToM – independent of age and 
verbal ability.  In TD participants, also, the ability to attribute false beliefs to self and 
other was significantly associated with performance on aspects of each of the tasks 
from Experiments 1 and 2.  These findings support the notion that recognising 
intentions and false beliefs depends upon the same representational mechanism (e.g., 
Perner, 1991).   
It is intriguing that amongst both ASD and TD participants, success on the 
knee-jerk task in Experiment 1 was most strongly related to success on the Plasters 
Self false belief question.  Note that both semantically and pragmatically, the test 
questions on the respective tasks are quite different: ‘Did you mean to move your 
leg?’ in the knee-jerk task, versus ‘What did you think was inside the box before you 
looked?’ in the Plasters Self task.  The answers required are also quite different: a 
yes/no response in the knee-jerk task, versus an open-ended response in the Plasters 
task.  Again, these findings suggest that the underlying representational demands are 
similar in each task, both requiring, it is argued, recognition of mental states as casual 
of actions: in the knee-jerk task, there was no intention to move and therefore the 
movement could not have been ‘meant’.  In the Plasters Self task, one’s (false) belief, 
rather than reality itself, caused one to choose the plasters box. 
The findings from Experiment 2 that participants with ASD were significantly 
impaired on a Transparent Intentions task clearly differs from the findings of Russell 
and Hill (2001) which provided little support for an ASD-specific impairment on this 
task.  However, concerns over aspects of Russell and Hill’s design, most notably their 
counterbalancing of the order of presentation of the Self and Other conditions and 
their use of potentially insensitive stimulus materials, suggest that the present results 
may be a more accurate reflection of the ability of children with ASD to represent 
their own (unfulfilled) intentions.   
Perhaps the discrepancy between the findings of the current study and those of 
Russell and Hill (2001) can be explained in terms of the comparison participants used 
in each study.  Comparison participants in Russell and Hill’s study performed quite 
poorly on standard false belief tasks and their performance on the Transparent 
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Intentions task appeared to reflect this.  However, comparison participants in the 
current study performed significantly better than participants with ASD on a false 
belief composite measure, which may explain their superior performance on the 
experimental task.  This explanation is partially supported by the finding that amongst 
both participants with ASD and TD children in the current study, ToM ability was 
significantly associated with performance on the Think test questions of the 
Transparent Intentions task, after the effects of age and verbal ability were controlled.   
The finding that ToM was related only to performance on the Think questions 
(in Self and Other-person conditions) of the Transparent Intentions task, but not to the 
Mean questions (in either condition), suggests that only the former question-type taps 
a meta-representational ToM.  Indeed, for TD participants, the Mean test questions 
were significantly less challenging than the Think test questions.  With hindsight, this 
result might have been predicted.  A number of studies have shown that before they 
are able to pass false belief tasks, young TD children can report an action as 
‘mistaken’ when a behaviourally specified goal does not match an outcome (e.g., 
Feinfield et al., 1999; Phillips et al. 1998; Shultz et al., 1980).  It was argued above 
that young children’s success in reporting unintended actions in such tasks is based on 
their recognition of desires, rather than intentions.  On this basis, young TD children 
in Experiment 2 may have succeeded on the Mean test questions of the Transparent 
Intentions task by defaulting to their concepts of desire, in the absence of a coherent 
concept of intention.  Therefore, this may be cause for concern over the validity of the 
Transparent Intentions task as a measure of intention understanding in TD children.  
However, in Experiment 1 TD children had a great deal of difficulty correctly 
reporting their reflex movements as unintentional, with participants’ performance on 
the knee-jerk closely associated with their ability to recognise their own false beliefs.  
The poorer performance of TD children on the test question from the knee-jerk task 
(‘Did you mean to move your leg?’) than the Mean test question from the Transparent 
Intentions task (‘Did you mean to draw X?’) may be explained by the fact that no 
desire was evident in the knee-jerk task.  Hence, unlike on the Transparent Intentions 
task, participants in Experiment 1 could not succeed on the test question by reporting 
on their desire, rather than intention, to have acted.  Overall, therefore, confidence can 
still be maintained in the conclusion that young TD children, as well as individuals 
with ASD, have difficulty in recognising intentions as mental states differentiated 
from desires.  
 
Wider theoretical implications of the current research 
 
Several theoretical implications follow from the current set of findings.  Specifically 
in relation ASD, the findings indicate that impairments in representing mental states 
in self are at least as profound as impairments in representing the mental states of 
other people.  This adds to the growing body of literature indicating diminution of at 
least some aspects of self-awareness in ASD (e.g., Ben-Shalom et al., 2003; Hobson 
et al., 2006; but see Williams & Happé, in press a), and in particular Theory of own 
Mind (Frith & Happé, 1999; Williams & Happé, in press b).   
 More generally, the results provide a direct challenge to models of 
mindreading that postulate distinct mechanisms for representing one’s own and 
others’ mental states (e.g., Nichols & Stich, 2003; Raffman, 1999).  Nichols and 
Stich, for instance, claim that there exists one cognitive mechanism for the 
representation of one’s own propositional attitudes and another mechanism for 
representing others’ propositional attitudes.  Furthermore, they claim that ASD 
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involves a deficit only in reading the minds of other people, leaving introspection of 
own mental states intact.  The current findings argue strongly against this position, 
suggesting that (a) individuals with ASD have as much difficulty recognising their 
own mental states as they do recognising others’ mental states and; (b) that one 
cognitive mechanism (or process) is involved in both recognising one’s own and 
others’ mental states (cf. Carruthers, in press).  Whether this mechanism/process 
involves a form of simulation, such that knowledge of one’s own mental states is 
employed to read others’ minds, or whether introspection of own mental states 
involves the same theoretical underpinnings as other-person mentalising is a matter of 
debate.  We believe there are persuasive arguments why simulation from one’s case 
cannot alone account for the ability to recognise mental states in others (e.g., 
Carruthers, in press; Hobson, 1990; Strawson, 1962; Williams & Happe, in press b; 
Wittgenstein, 1953), although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these 
arguments directly.  What is clear from the current findings is that, in addition to 
difficulties with representing false beliefs, individuals with ASD also show deficits in 
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Table 1: Participant characteristics for Experiment 1: Means and (standard 
deviations)   
a Due to limited child availability, PIQ data was available for n = 20 participants with ASD and n = 20 comparison participants. 




 ASD ASD-Extended DD TD 
n 22 30 22 32 
CA: yrs 10.61 (3.51) 10.02 (3.21) 11.20 (3.56) 4.43 (0.68) 
    
VMA:yrs 7.69 (3.06) 7.02 (2.90) 7.51 (2.42) 4.86 (1.24) 
    
VIQ 77.32 (17.38) 76.50 (15.58) 73.32 (15.71) 104.1 (10.40) 
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Table 2: Percentage of participants from each group in Experiment 1 passing the 
Plasters Self, Plasters Other and Sally-Anne tasks, as well as overall performance 
across the three tasks   
 ASD-extended 
(n = 30) 
DD  
(n = 22) 
TD  
(n = 32) 
Plasters Self 50.0 90.9 37.5 
Plasters Other 56.7 86.4 56.3 
Sally-Anne 63.3 86.4 83.9* 
Total False Belief Score 
(out of 3) 
1.70 (SD 1.37) 2.64 (SD 0.95) 1.81 (SD 1.04)* 











Table 3: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting knee-jerk 
task performance 
    95% confidence interval  
for expB 
Variable B (SE) Wald p Lower exp B Upper 
Block 0       
   Constant -0.13 (0.35) 0.13 .72  0.88  
Block 1
a
       
   Constant -1.61  (0.78) 4.32 .04  0.20  
   Plasters Self 2.29 (0.91) 6.06 .01 1.58 9.29 54.77 
Block 2
b
       
   Constant -1.01 (2.78) 0.13 .72  0.36  
   Plasters Self 2.05 (1.20) 2.95 .09 0.78 7.78 80.91 
   VMA -0.10 (0.45) 0.49 .82 0.38 0.91 2.19 
a
At Block 1, R² = .28 (Nagelkerke).  Model ²(1, N = 32) = 7.53, p = .006.   
b
















Table 4: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables (in reverse order) 
predicting knee-jerk task performance 
    95% confidence interval  
for expB 
Variable B (SE) Wald p Lower exp B Upper 
Block 0       
   Constant -0.13 (0.35) 0.13 .72  0.88  
Block 1
a
       
   Constant 2.88 (1.61) 3.19 .07  17.80  
   VMA -0.63 (0.33) 3.55 .06 0.28 0.54 1.03 
Block 2
b
       
   Constant -1.01 (2.78) 0.13 .72  0.36  
   VMA -0.10 (0.45) 0.49 .82 0.38 0.91 2.19 
   Plasters Self  2.05 (1.20) 2.95 .09 0.78 7.78 80.91 
a
At Block 1, R² = .16 (Nagelkerke).  Model ²(1, N = 32) = 4.19, p = .006.   
b


















Table 5: Participant characteristics for Experiment 2: Means and (standard 
deviations)  
 ASD DD TD 
n 34 30 35 
CA: years 11.06 (3.59) 11.12 (3.55) 4.46 (0.67) 
   
VMA: years 7.48 (2.79) 7.33 (2.00) 4.81 (1.23) 
   
VIQ 76.03 (17.70) 73.10 (18.60) 103.6 (9.79) 
   
PIQ
a
 75.69 (19.93) 63.67 (17.81) – 
   
a Due to limited child availability, PIQ data was collected for n = 29 participants with ASD and n = 24 DD participants. 
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Table 6: Percentage of participants from each group in Experiment 2 passing the 
Plasters Self, Plasters Other and Sally-Anne tasks, as well as overall performance 
across the three tasks   
 ASD 
(n = 34) 
DD  
(n = 30) 
TD  
(n = 35) 
Plasters Self 51.5* 86.2* 37.1* 
Plasters Other 63.6* 86.2* 45.7* 
Sally-Anne 70.6 90.0 82.9* 
Total False Belief Score 
(out of 3) 
1.85 (SD 1.23)* 2.63 (SD 0.90)* 1.73 (SD 1.04)** 
*Based on 33/34 ASD participants, 29/30 DD participants, and 34/35 TD participants 







Table 7: Correlations between ToM total score (0 – 3) and performance on each test 
question from the Transparent Intentions task.  Figures in brackets are partial 
correlations after controlling age and verbal ability 
 ToM total score 
Transparent Intentions test question ASD TD 
Self: Mean .57*** (.20) .08 
Self: Think .78*** (.61***) .63*** (.51**) 
Other-person: Mean .48** (.16) .28 
Other-person: Think .59*** (.34*) .50** (.43**) 






Figure 1: Experimental materials for the Transparent Intentions task 
















Figure 2: Percentage (and n) of ASD, DD and TD participants passing each test 
question from the Transparent Intentions task 













































p = .003 
p = .01 p = .05 
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Footnotes 
1. Given that performance IQ data was not available for two ASD and two 
comparison participants we wanted to rule out the possibility that our groups could 
have become significantly different from each other on these ability measures if these 
individuals had been assessed.  To ensure this, we arbitrarily assigned the two 
outstanding ASD participants with the minimum performance IQ score possible (45 
points) and the two remaining comparison participants with the maximum 
performance IQ score (140 points).  We then re-analysed the data.  Group 
comparisons on these measures yielded the following results: t(42) = - 0.43, p = .67, r 
= .07.  The effect size for this comparison was small (Cohen, 1992) and, thus, both 
groups would still have been well matched even if these two comparison participants 
had achieved extremely high performance IQ scores whilst the two ASD participants 
had achieved extremely low performance IQ scores. 
 
 
 
